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IN THE SUP.REME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
l{l~ILEDG·E URANil'l\l AND MINING·

~

CORPOR.A. TION and l(ENNETH J. l\IcC()H~IICI~,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vs.FEDERAL RESOURCES CORPOR.ATION and HE·CLA MINING COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.

\ Ko. 9604

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF Tll:BJ KIND OF CASE
Tllis is an action (a) for an accounting of royal tie:-;
o'ving fro1n defendant operators to plaintiffs, the owners
of a royalty interest of a ~·2<;{-, of all gross proceeds fron1
the sale of all ore" fron1 certain mining claims, (b)
for judgment based upon the difference bet\veen the
an1ount actually paid and the amount detern1ined to be
due pursuant to the aeeounting, (c) for a declaratory
judgn1ent as to royalties to be paid in the future.
DISPOSITIOX IN LO'\TER COlTRT
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs~
1notion 'vas that defendants be ordered to render an
accounting to plaintiffs based upon 2% of the sales price
actually received. The motion ''"as denied.
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Defendants n1oved for sunnnary judgn1ent. Defendants' 1notion \Yas that if raw ore was not sold, royalties
should be based on the value of ·raw ore, or in the
alternative that royalties should be based on the net
proceeds of sale of concentrated ore after deducting
processing charges. This rnotion was granted. The Court
not only granted defendants' rnotion for summary judgment, but also decreed that plaintiffs have and recover
nothing by their suit..
RELIEF SOl~GHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also seek judgment in their favor as a matter
of la\v, or, that failing, a trial on the issues of the case.
STATEMENT OF F A·CTS
There is no extensive record upon which to base
a statement of facts since the lower court's judgment
was made after an unreported hearing on n1otions for
su1nn1ary judgment, during \Yhich no evidence was introduced and no admissions were n1adP. Judge Elle~tt stated
that his ruling \Vas based •'some,vhat'' upon his personal
knowledge of mining and milling practices derived from
his employment with Kennecott Copper Con1pany as
an accountant, prior to his becoming a Judge. The reported portion of his comment on the subject was ''I am
drawing somewhat on my experience of seven years
dealing \vith people that shipped ore and checking their
contracts" (Tr. 210).
Insofar as error in granting defendants' tnotion for
sunnnary· judgtnent is concerned, this statement of fact
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u1ight be baHed upon \vhat plaintiffs 'vould have p·roveu
had they been pertnitted a trial. This is in aceordance
\vith the rule set forth in 6 lJ!loore's Federal Practice
2364 that the party moving for ~nurunary judg~nent has
the burden of establishing the lack of triable issue. I-lo,,·_
ever, sinee plaintiffs also appeal fro1n failure of the
court to grant plaintiffs' motion for sunnnary judgtnent,
the facts stated are limited to those established by defendants' admissions and ans"rers to interrogatories in
the record.
In 1953 various mining clailns containing uraniu1n
and vanadiun1 known as the Radon Clailns ".,.ere located.
The locators conveyed these clailns and reserved a royalty of H15 per cent of all gross proceeds fron1 the sale
of ore" (Tr 29). Plaintiffs' predecessors \Vl re assigned
a 27c royalty (from this 15% royalty) by t\\yo successive
assigntnents. The first assigninent incorrectly referred
to the royalty as "net mill or smelter returns" rather
than "gross proceeds of sale'' as originally reserved (Tr
31). The next assignment described the royalty as "2%
royalty from gross sales of all ore" (Tr 33) 'Yhich
correctly paraphrased the initial reservation. In 1955,
to perfect defendants' title to the c.lai1ns involved, and
to clarify and make certain the terms of the reserved
royalty, defendants' predecessor obtained a quitclaim
deed from plaintiffs' predecessor and gave in return
their letter specifying the royalty to be a" gross royalty."
1

This agreement \vas drafted by the defendants
through their attorney (Tr 96, 121). It is still in force
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and governs past and future royalty payments. The
exact language thereof is a.s follows:
''Federal l~raniun1. c·orporation hereby acknowledges and confirms to you that you are the
owner of a royalty of tw'o percent (2%) of all of
the gross proceeds from the sale of all ore from
the lode 1nining claims listed above, the gross
proceeds to include any bonuses or premiums
upon the ores mined, but shall not include transportation and development allowances puid or
granted to the owners of said claims; it is further
ackno,vledged that the aforesaid royalty of t'vo
percent (:2%) of all gross proceeds, as above
specified, shall be paid by the ore depot or purchaser directly to you, or your heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns, care of 200 North
Fourth East, Bountiful, Utah, or at such other
place or address as you or your successors to this
interest may designate in writing to the President
of Federal Uranium Corporation." (Tr 49)
Until 1958 defendants 1narketed unconcentrated ore
by sales to both the AEC and lTranimn Reduction Company, a licensed buyer, (Tr 94, 1~3-162). Royalties during this period "\vere based upon the gross proceeds,
such gross proceeds being based upon a price schedule
set forth in AEC ·Circular 5. (Tr 9-t, 1~3-16~). In 1958,
however, despite the fact that AEC Circular 5 was to
continue in effect untill\Iarch 31, 1962 so that any market
for unprocessed ore based upon the Circular 5 price
schedule continued to be readily available~ defendants
without consulting plaintiffs, changed their 1narketing
practices. Instead of selling the ore to lJRC upon delivery, defendants had r:R,C act a~ a cn~ton1 1nill and re-
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tained title to the ore until after it "\\"as concentrated .
.A sale

'va~

then made to lTRC after milling.

Defendant~

entered into t\vo agreements ",.ith URC to accomplish
this, a custon1 milling agree1nent ('rr 70) and a sales
agree1nent (Tr 87).
The Inilling process does not break dO\\"ll the r:- aO-.
contained in the ore, but rather eliminates tnost of the
eountry rock and other in1purities. The processes of
stnelting and refining which \vould eliminate the oxygen
1nineralizer from the lT 3 0 8 , leaving onJ~~ uranimn, ar(~
not involved, hut occur at a late·r stagr. lT 3 0~ is contained
in both unmilled and milled ore (Tr 37, Tr 70, reverse
~ide). The lT 3 0 8 content of the orP has al\\'"ays been the
basis for the price paid to defendants for the uranimn
eontent of the ore regardless of \vhether uneoncentra.ted
or concentrated ore \\'"as sold. (Tr. 37, 88).
By delaying the sale until after tnilling, instead of
~elling unconcentrated ore, defendants obtained an incon1e
tax advantage, in that dressed ore, being n1orP valuable_
1~ the basis for a greater depletion a.llo,vance. Defendant~
depleted the increased amount ( Tr. ±3, 92).

When the sales a.rra.ngen1ent ",.a~ changed so that
sales occurred after instead of before milling, defendant~
did not also change the royalty computation to reflect
the increased gross proceeds, but continued to cotnpute
the1n as if they had continued to make sales of unproces~
ed ore based upon AEC ·Circular 5 guaranteed n1initnn1n
pri(·e schedules (Tr. 43, 92).
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Defendants have made royalty paYJnents only after
the sales oeeurred. In fact, defendants have stockpiled
in excess of 9000 tons \vithout any payment of royalty
thereon ( Tr. 43, 92).
Defendants have kept two sets of books, since they
started selling dressed ore, one based upon actual sales
price of the concentrated ore,· and the other, called "Circular 5 Basis Sheets,'' based upon a computed price that
would have been received had unprocessed ore been sold
under the price schedule itemize·d by AEC Circular 5.
(Tr.170). Royalty payments to date have been computed
upon the latter. ( Tr. 43, 92). Circular 3 expires ~larch
31, 1962 ( Tr. 37).
No accounting 'vhatsoever has been n1ade by defendants as sought by plaintiffs' complaint. There has therefore been no accounting for uranium royalties; nor for
vanadium royalties, although the ore contains vanadium
(Tr. 163, 167); nor for part of the sales price of the ore,
which defendants contend is "development allowance" not
subject to royalty but which plaintiffs contend is part
of the sales price (Tr. 88).
ARGU~IENT

~J:..ti.L
ff

POINT I.
----;---THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTEnl~
PENDANT5' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Sup·reme Co1.trt should not presunze the
lower court's interpretation of the contract was correct.
(a)

''The rule that the evidence and findings will
be reviewed in the light most favorable to the de-
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ter1nination of the trial court doPs not apply to
the interpretation of the language or legal effect
of docmnents, nor to the application of principles
of la\\", but only to questions of fact."
Ellerbeck r. Iiau·s, 1 lJ. 2d 229, 265 P. ~d 404
'
407.
.

The royalty provisiou is e:rpressly based upon
1Jrocee.ds of sal c: au d e.rp re s."'·ly prolz ibits d erfu ctio ns. 'rhe
royalty language "gross proeeeds from the sale of all
ore," has four key ''"ords: gross, proceeds, Hale and ore.
(b)

1. Gross.
The pertinent definition by \\rebster of
as follows:

~'gross'' ~~

H·Consisting of an overall total exclusive of
deductions (gross earnings, gross p,roduction ... )
-opposed to net.''

Webster's Third New International
ary (1961)

Dict~on

"Gross'' has not needed definition by the courts except as it is incidentally defined in cases arising out of
the definition of ''net.''
In an old treatise on mining,~ Snyder nn ill.iues 1003,
Section 1257, appears the following:
1\IEANING OF 'NET PROCEED~S' as applied in the western states. - In the "\vestern
states the practice has become almost universal,
as applied to the royalties payable on ores mined
and marketed from precious metal mines, to base
the payments upon net proceeds, "~hich means
generally the price received· on the sale of ore less
H
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the smelter charges and railroad freights. Soinetimes it ineludes sampling charges, but never Inining charges, and very seldom wagon freight, unless
the lease reads 'a certain percentage of the ore or
net value of the ore delivered on the dump,' in
which case, of course, only mining charges are
excluded. In defining the meaning of 'net proceeds' the court of appeals of Colorado very clearly states the position of the parties in the follow·ing 'vords : 'We are referred to a number of authorities in 'vhich the definition is given of the
'vords ~net proceeds.' ""\\re need not specially notice these authorities, because ''Te are in perfect
agreement \vith them. The "Tords 'net proceeds,'
as used in a contract, where their signification is
not qualified or restricted by other words in the
same contract, mean what remains of the gross
proceeds after all expense and loss incurred in
realizing them are deducted ... They have confined the deductions to be made from the gross
proceeds, in order that the result 1na~. . be net proceeds, \vithin certain li1nits. They say that the
royalties shall be paid 'on the net proceeds from
all s1nelter and freight charges and mill returns.'
These words are not well put together, but every
miner and every person familiar with transactions
involving leases of mining property lrnows exactly
'vhat they mean. They n1ean that frsight charges
and charges for treatment are to come out of the
gross 1nill or s1nelter values, and ,,. .hat is left is the
net proceeds."
Snyder.

a~

Malouey v.

authority for this proposition, cites t\\. .o cases,
J.~o1:e,

11 Colo ..A.pp. :.?SS,

Yank r. llordeau.r, :23 J[ont.
The

C~olorado

~05,

5~

P. 1029, 1030, and

58 P. 42, 45.

Court says:
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·'The \vords 'net proceeds', as used in a contraet, \\'"here there signification is not qualified
or restrictP(l h~,. other "rords in the same contract,
1nean "?hat ren1ains of the gross proceeds after
all expense and loss incurred in realizing theut
are deducted.''
The

~fontana

Court says:
~~The net proceeds of the ore after milling or
reduction were to be equally divided. So the contract provides. It is therefore apparent, ... that
the expression 'net proceeds' was employed and
understood as signifying the avails of the ore, less
charges of milling and reduction only."

It is clear fro1n these citations that the phrase~ 'gros~
proceeds'' 1neans the entire sum received from the sale.
\vhile Hn(:lt proceeds'' tneans gross proceeds less exp·ense~
incurred in realizing such returns.
The ph rase ''the gross proceeds realized" is used
1n the ad valore1n assessment on mines. The value of
Inetalliferous mines for assessment is based on the annual net proceeds thereof, \Yhich phrase is defined as the
gro~~ proceed~ less certain deductions, 'vhich deduction~
include 1nilling cost~. (59-5-8 UCA 1953) Under thi~
~tatute [~. S. Snzelting, Refining & lllining Conzpany v.
Haynes, 111 lT. 172, 176 P. 2d 622, defined the phrase
··the gros~ proceeds realized" as meaning the total
a1nount of 1noney received from ores extracted from the
tnining claims.
It \Yill be extensively argued by the defendant~, and
the lo\Yer court evidently concluded, that the parties intended a "net smelter" or "net proceeds" royalty. If the
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parties had so intended, they "\vould have said as much.
Suunning up the above authorities, gross is the antithesis of net and any deduction therefrom changes the
gross to net.
With no record at all upon which to base its ruling,
the lo,ver court, in effect, rewrote the royalty provision
to make it read, ''net proceeds fro1n the sale of all ore.''
2.

Proceeds.

The pertinent definition by vVebster of " proceeds" is
as follows:
4

"What is produced by or derived from something (as a sale ... ) by way of total revenue: the
total amount brought in : yield, returns.''

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961)
By using ''proceeds," the parties provided that the
royalty holders had no interest in the ore as such, but
only a right to the money derived therefrom. In other
words, the royalty holders do not own the ore itself, nor
do they have the right to take a percentage of the ore in
kind. It is not the type of royalty such as is sometimes
found in an oil and gas lease where the royalty holder
has the right to take 1/Sth of the production in kind.
The right to royalty payments does therefore not
arise until there are "proceeds." This is borne out by
the practice of the defendants wherein they make royalty
paYlnents only after the sale has occurred after stockpiling and after processing.
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With no rec.ord to support such a ruling, the lo"·~r
court disregarded the \Vord '~proceeds'' and instead of
basing the royalty upon the atnount received, based it
upon the atnount that \vonld have been received had there
been proceeds of sale at an earlier date 'vhen the ore
'vas in its ra"· state.
The court disregarded the \\'"ord "proceeds" and, in
effect substituted therefor the v.rord '~value" in ruling
that the accounting should be based upon the fair market
value of ra\\· ore, despite the clear language of the contract that royalty should be based on the actual a1nount
received, rather than upon so1ueone 's opinion as to \\·hat
the value of the ore "·as. Had the parties intended
''value" they "rould have said so.
The fact that '~value" "·a~ not intended i~ further
emphasized by the additional language in the agreernent
creating a royalt)·, "Therein it is provided that the royalty
"shall be paid by the ore depot or purchaser directly to
you'' ( Tr. 49). The purchaser of the ore need not be the
one who did the milling, and a buyer other than one doing
the milling, 'vould have no infor1nation upon which to
base any deduction for milling, nor "rould he have anything upon which to base a payment if the royalty were
based upon ''value'' rather than actual price paid.
The provision in the lo,ver court's smnmary judgment that defendants pay part of the 1nilling cost also
disregards the "'"ord ~~proceeds.'' The obligation to pay
a portion of the milling charges presupposes an o'ynership interest in the ore being rnilled, in order that there
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he any logic in requiring a contribution toward the 1nilling
eharge. rrhe royalty holders do not own the ore and a
require·ment that they pay a processing charge requires
the pay1nent by plaintiffs for the processing of defendants' ore.
The decision as to 'vhether or not the ore should he
processed, by "Tho1n it should be processed, 'vhen it should
be processed and the cost thereof is entirely within the
control of defendants. The royalty holders are not parties
to the 1nilling contract nor have they had any say "Thatsoever relating to it. The language of the royalty provision indicates the parties contemplated that such decisions should be made by defendants 'vho 'vere the operators of the enterprise. The language permits the royalty holders to share in the result but not to dictate the
method of arriving at that result. The royalty agreement,
if construed as 'v-ritten, nevertheless provides protection
to plaintiffs, in that the royalty holders can safely assume
that defendants will so operate that the maximum return
will be obtained, since that is to the advantage of both the
producer and the royalty holder. But "Then the smnmary
judgment allows deductions to he n1ade from the proceeds, the situation changes completely and such protection is lost. The effect of the lo,ver court's summary
judgment is that it takes a'Yay fro1n the royalty holder~
the right to share in the ultimate result "Thile at the same
time it leaves the important decisions as to 'vhether or
not the ore should be processed, by 'vhom, ,yhen and at
wha.t cost, entirely "Tithin the discretion of the defendants.
I larl the royalty holders intended that something other
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than the proceeds of the sale \Vould deter1nine the a1nount
of royalt~, pay1nents, they \Vould have been interested in,
and would have had provisions controlling the above rnentioned factors. No such provisions were rnade because
the parties intended the proceeds to deter1nine the
atnount of royalty payments.

3. Sale.
The pertinent definition hy \\r ebster of
follo"rs:

"sale~'

is as

•· .1\ contract transferring the absolute or gen-

eral ov\rnership of property fron1 one person or
corporate body to another for a price."

Webster's Third N eu' International DicthJnary (1961)
r_rhere is no question that defendants retained title in
themselves until after thP completion of the ore milling
process.
There \Yas no necessity to do so. The ra\\'" ore \\"as
readily saleable under a price schedule based upon AEC
Circular 5 and \\,.ill be so saleable untill\f arch 31, 1962.
(Tr. 37).
Defendants have designedly delayed the time of sale
until after the ore has been processed so that it will
have a higher sales price, resulting in greater ''proceeds
of sale" or 'gross income" upon \\rhich a 23% income
tax depletion allo\vance is based. This is under 26 U.S.C..A.. 613 \Yhich allo·w·s percentage depletion of the "gross
incon1e frorn mining.'' Both the depletion and the royalty
4
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are based upon gross (proceeds or income) yet the defendants are allo,ved by the summary judgment to intentionally increase the gross and thus profit by increasing the 23 'lo depletion, and at the same time not bear
any resulting consequenee of increase of royalty as to the
:2% royalty.
Defendants even keep t'vo complete sets of books,
one based upon sales prices actually received, which books
they sho'v to the Internal Revenue, and the other based
upon Circular 5 AEC· prices which have nothing to do
'vith the sales price received, which set of books they
sho'v to the royalty holders (Tr. 170). The lower court
says this is entirely proper, despite the fact plaintiffs'
royalty agree1nent provides that payments shall be based
upon proceeds of sale.
When Circular 5 expires on 1Iarch 31st of this year,
there 'vill be no guaranteed n1inimun1 price for unprocessed ore (Tr. 37). There then 1nay or 1nay not be
any market for such ore. If there is a market, it n1ay be
at a much lo,Yer price than under Circular 5; the price
will probably fluctuate, from ti1ne to time; and there ,viii
probably be different prices depending on such factors
as different buyers and sellers, different grades, and
types of ores, certain(Y of availability, costs of 1nining,
size of contracts, etc. Defendants have a contract 'vith
Uraniu1n Reduction Company to ~ell eoncentrated ore
for $8.00 per pound of lT 3 0s contained therein fron1 April
1, 1962 until December 31, 1966 ( Tr. 88 reverse side). The
parties "rould hardly have intended that defendants could
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receive proceeds of sale frotn such contract for a high,
certain price, over a long tertn, and yet be obligated to
pay royalties based upon a different market prire "rhieh
1nay be non-existent, or depressed or fluctuating. On the
other hand, they \vould not have intended that <:~xpired
Circ.ular 5 prices would control. They intPnded that actual sales price would control.
The lo\\·er court by the sutntnar~· judgntent leaves the
ro~·alty holders without the right to claim royalties "rhen
the ores are 1nined, but bases them upon the value at
that tilne. If the royalty is to be re"\\rritten so that it has
the effect of a royalty based upon value of ra\\· ore, then
plaintiffs should have the right to insist upon a sale just
as soon as the ore is mined. The lo\\rer court gave theu1
no such right, and in fact expressly provided that defendants "in their absolute judgment and discretion 1nay
either sell raw ore in its natural state or process it or
cause it to be processed prior to sale."
4.

Ore..

The complete definition by ,,.,.ebster of "ore" is
follows:

a~

"1a: a natural or native Inineral that can
usually be profitably mined and treated for the
extraction of any of its constituents (iron ore.,
copper ore) b: a source from which valuable matter is extracted e: an unrefined condition or material 2 : Precious Metal."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961)
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Concentrated ore cornes \vithin all of these definitions. Definition la includes treat1nent. lb does not require that it be in its native state, and smelting and refining t-}xtractive processes have not occurred at the 1nilling
stage. lc provides that the 1naterial is ore until it is refined (refining occurs after the sale). 2 provides that
even in the 1netalic state, \vhich \Y·ould not occur until
after refining, that it \vould be ore.
When the ore has been concentrated, it is sometimes
referred to as '"concentrate.'' The lo"~er court based its
entire judgment on the premise that concentrating the
ore changes its form so that it is no longer "ore."
. .~s sho\vn above, the definitions of "ore" include

concentrated ore. Like\vise the definitions of ''concentrate" show that "concentrate'' is included in the term
Hore.''
The pertinent definition by \Y"ehster of the noun
''concentrate" is as follo,vs:
''son1ething obtained by concentration: a concentration or concentrated substanre: as a: the
l'Plnainder of dressed ore that contains the nlineral sought.''
The pertinent definition of the verb '"concentrate"
lS:

"'to rt nder less dilute or diffuse : . . . ( :2) : to
separate dross fro1n (repeated concentrating of
th t} o rp is neePssary) ( 3) : to free fron1 i1npuri. ''
t1es.
1
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The pertinent definition of ~'dress" as used in the
definition of ·~concentrate'' is: '"to free (as grain or ore)
of irnpurities or irregularities."

lVebster's Third New International Dictiouary (1961)
These definitions show that a concentrate is a forn1
of ore. The example (a) for the noun shows that it is a
constitutent of "dressed ore.'' Exrunple ( 2) for the verb
~hows that neither the first concentrating nor repeated
concentratings change the 1naterial from' ·ore.''
Another definition of "ore" is:
''Any material containing valuable metallic
constitutents for the sake of which it is mined and
worked.'' U.S. v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Crnnpany. 218 F. 2d 424, 425.
This definition contemplates the ore "rill be ~~,,·orked''
or dressed and thus includes both raw and dressed ore.
Ore "·as defined by the United States Supreme Court
as: •'The co1npound of a 1netal and some other substance,
as oxygen, sulphur or arsenic, called its 1nineralizer, by
w·hich its properties are disguised or lost." Marvel v.
J/ erritt, 116 U.S. 11, 29 L.Ed. 550, see also Ozark Chen~
ical Co;HpaHy v. Jones, 125 F.2d 1, 2. Applying this definition, ore \\·as sold by defendants. At the ti1ne of sale
the ore had been concentrated but neither smelted nor
refined. Although later smelting and refining \vould
eli1ninate the oxygen mineralizer, at the ti1ne of the sale
h~· defendants to Uranium Reduction Company the mineralizPr ,,·as still present. There was still a compound of
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uranium metal and oxygen, na1nely U 3 08 , plus son1e remaining substances which had not been eli1ninated by the
concentration process.
In Yank v. Bordeaux, 23 Mont. 205, 58 P. 42, 45, the
court said the "proceeds of the ore after milling'' were
the "avails of the ore." The court "~as thereby referring
to concentrated ore as "ore."
(c)

Parol ev.ide nee should not be considered.

In the absence of ambiguity or uncertainty, the court
must determine the intention of the parties fro1n the
instru1ne.nt itself in accordance "·ith ordinary accepted
meaning of the v.rords used.
Oregon Short Line RR Co. 1·. Idalw Stockyards
Co., 12 U. 2d 205, 364 P. 2d 826;

Ephraim Theater Company
321 p. 2d 221.

1/.

Hau:k, 7 U. 2d 163,

·The intent of parties to a contract should be ascertained from the four corners of the instrument itself if
unambiguous. Only if runbiguous are other contemporaneous writings concerning the same subject matter and
extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions considered.
Oregon Short Line RR Co. 'Z:. Idaho Stockya.rds
Co., 12 U.2d 205, 364 P .2d 826 ;
T.anner r. [Jtah Pou.lt~ry, 11 l 1.2d 353, 359 P.2d 18;
Davis v. Payne & Day l nc., 10 lT.2d 53, 348 P.2d

337;
llf oody v. Snu·t 1l, 9 U.2d 139, 340 P. 2d 83;
Hatch t:. Adanz.s, 8 1"'".2d 82, 329 P.2d 285:
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Ephrahn Theater Co. v. Hawk, 7 U.2d 163, 321
P. 2d 221;
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98,
306 P. 2d 773;
Starley r. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 lT. 577, 74 P.2d
1221.

As sho,vn by the above definitions in I (b), there is no
ambiguity in the phrase ~~gross proceeds fron1 the sale
of all ore.'' The royalt~- provision is expressly based
upon proceeds of sale and the language expressly prohibits deductions.
(d) Processed ore can be the basis for royalty
payments.

The fact that the ore has been processed by concentrating does not preclude royalties from being based upon
the processed ore p·rice. In State v. Northwest i'Jf agnesite
Co., 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P. 2d 643, 648, the royalty was
based upon the price received for processed (dead
burned) magnesite where royalty was to be based on
sales and the magnesite ore was treated before sale.
(e)

The language clearly supports plaintiffs' mo-

tion.
Clearly, a "gross" and not a net royalty 'vas created.
Clearly, the royalty is based upon ''proceeds from
sale" rather than upon any indefinite "value'' which
might vary according to the opinion of the p·erson setting

it.
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Clearly, ''ore'' is a broader term than either the
lilnited terms ''raw,. ore'' or "dressed" or ''concentrated
ore'' and therefore includes them. Only when the mineralizer, oxygen, has been elirninated does it cease to be
ore.
Because there is no arnbiguity, the court cannot consider parol evidence whereby ''gross" could be changed
to ''net" or "\Yherehy "proceeds of sale" could be changed
to "value of ra"~ ore."
The unambiguou~ language of the agreement is conclusive. The court's decision should have been based
thereon and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
should have been granted.
POINT II
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE GRANTING
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The burden is upon the defendants to establish
a rcord shouJing no issuf of fact. The theory underlying
a motion for sun11na.ry judg1nent is closely akin to that
underlying a rnotion for a directed verdict. The summary
judgrnent procedure i~ not designed to supplant live
trials where there i~ a genuine issue of material fact to be
tried. The lo,ver court, on a 1notion for smnmary judgment, should not resolve factual inferences, or other"~ise
resolve an~· genuine 1naterial issue of fact. The party
1noving for sunnnar~~ judgrnent has the burden of clearly
establishing thP lack of a triable issue of fact upon a
l'Peord that i~ adequatP to the legal issue presented. 6
lll oo re ·s F cd era! Practice ~:3()-l-.
(a)
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(b) The record should be considered in a light nzost
farorable to plaintiffs.

For purpo~Ps of considering \vhether slunmary judgtnent should have been granted for defendants, the
Supreme ( . ourt should accept all of plaintiffs' allegations
n1ade below as facts.
Watkins v. Simonds, 11 U.2d 46, 35-t P.~d 852.
The record should be considered in a light most
favorable to p~laintiffs.
Gantmon v. Federated Milk Producers Association, 11 U .2d 421, 360 P .2d 1018.

(c) The royalty provision is expressly based upon
proceeds of sale and expressly prohibits ,deductions.

This is fully covered under Point I.
(d) There is no record on u,hich to nzodify the
royalty provision.

There is no record upon which to base any decision
that the royalty language "gross proceeds from the sale
of all ore" has any meaning other than its usual and
ordinary meaning.
It is not the province of the court to write a new
agreement for the parties. Holbrook v. Webster's Inc. 7
U.2d 1-tS, 320 P .2d 661
Even if a contract is ill advised and burdensome, the
court cannot make a new contract for the parties.
Tooele C ify v. l)ettle,meJZt Canyon Irrigation Co.,
-t lT. :Zd 215, 291 P. 2d 881.
1
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At the very least, before the lower court directed deductions to be made fron1 a gross royalty provision or directed payments to be based upon value of ra"" ore instead
of upon ''proceeds of sale" there 'vould have to be a
record upon "~hich to base such a ruling. There is no evidence, nor are there any admissions, affidavits or any
other bases for the court's variation fro1n the express
tenns of the gross royalty provision.
(e) Rules of constr'ltction in the record support
plaintiffs', not defendants' motion.

If there "rere any ambiguity in the royalty language,
the contract should be construed strictly against defendants, for not only '\\ras the royalty agreen1ent drafted by
defendants, it 'vas drafted by defendants' attorney (Tr.
96, 121).
Tauner

t:.

Patterson

[]talz Poultry, 11 lT. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18;
1·.

W,ilcox, 11 1J.2d 264, 358 P. 2d 88;

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 U. 2d
98, 306 p. 2d 773.
(f) Parol Eridence in the recottd supports plaintiffs,' not defendants' m.otion.

As shown in point I (c), parol evidence should not be
considered. But even if there "~ere an1biguity in the
royalty language, and it should be considered as to the
meaning of "ore,'' the paro1 evidence in the record
sho"~s that the sale of "'concentrates" is the sale of concentrated ore~ and that ''concentrates" are a fonn of ore.
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The defendants thetnselves consider that concentrates are ore. The follo"?ing are specific instances in the
record evidencing this :
Hecla's sales records showing the actual sales of
concentrated ore to URC on 'vhich plaintiffs claim their
royalty should be based show '~total ore value," not Htotal
concc ntrate value" ( Tr. 170).
Federal in its fourth annual report showing income
of its subsidiaries shows:
Hlncotne Uraniurn Concentrate Ore Sales,
$3,7 4-0,025." ( Tr. 58 (a) ).
Federal Resources Corporation in its annual report
of April 30, 1960, shows :
'~4th.

It tnust be remembered that there is
no commercial stockpile of uranium. All of the
ore mined an.d milled under government contract
has been purchased for military use." (Tr. 62).
Radorock Resources Inc. (merged into Federal) 1n
its annual report of April 30, 1959, says:
"Radon Mine ... A contract has been signed
with the Uranium Reduction Company providing
for a market for our ore through 1966." (Tr. 53)
This reference is to the sales agreement under which
plaintiffs claim royalties.
In an affidavit by the president of defendant Federal
Resources Corporation, he says :
''Over 90% of the gross income of the corporation was for the fiscal year year ending April
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30, 1960, realized from production of ores fron1
mining p·roperties located in San Juan Countv.
State of Utah." ( Tr. 96, 120).
··
' 1arious

provisions in the custon1 1nilling agreement
between defendants and Uranium Reduction Company
show that defendants consider concentrated ore as ''ore,"
as follows:
"O,vnership of ore in process," (Tr. 77 reverse side)
as a heading indicates that it is ore during the processing
as does also
"owners recognize that the processes necessary for concentration may require that ... processor co-mingle owners ore.'' ( Tr. 77, reverse
side).
"All risk of loss, theft or destruction of ore
during or ... after the concentration process ...
shall be on the owners," ( Tr 78)
indicates that it is ore after the processing.
A further indication that the sale "~as a sale of "'ore,.
In a concentrated form, is the tax depletion treatment
allO,YP(l the uranium industry, including defendants~
""hich treat~ milling as a part of mining. As previously
Htated, this is not a situation in 'Yhich a finished product
ha~ resulted fron1 the processing. l\Iilling is solely for
the purpose of concentrating the ores. After the n1illing
proeess the concentrated ores are smelted and refined until a finished product results. Defendants have treated
1nilling as still part of the process of 1nining ore in Inaking their tax returns under 26 USC~\ 613. This act per-
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tnits the nune operator to take a depletion allo,vance
ba::;ed upon "'the gross income from the property.'' This
is defined as •'the gross inc.ome from mining." The tern1
''tnining" includes not merely the extraction of the ores
or rninerals frorn the ground but also the "treatment
processes considered as mining , '' including, in the case
of uranium, "'crushing, grinding and beneficiation by
concentration." The defendants are thus taking inconsistent positions. For tax depletion they assert to the Goverment that concentration of ore is just part of the mining
process "~hereby ore is obtained, but to the royalty holders they assert that concentration is not a part of mining
but is a process 'vhich completely changes the ore mined
in to something else.
(g)

The co1trt erred 'tn granting defendants' 1notion.

The court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment and thereby ruled, even without any evidence
as to custo1n of the trade or any other parol evidence,
that "ore" as used in the royalty provision could not
n1ean processed ore, but as a matter of law 1neant only
raw ore.
This is erroneous for the following reasons:
1. The general term "'ore" does include both of the
more specific ter1ns ''raw ore'' and "concentrated ore.''
~.

If that "\Vere not true, then at last the general
term '"ore'' nti9ht include both of the more specific terms
.. raw ore'' and hconcentrated ore." In such event there
w·ould be t"vo possibilities:
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(a) a construction of ''raw ore" would be avoided
because if the royalty language were construed to mean
"gross proceeds from the sale of raw ore," there would
be conflicting provisions because, since 1958, defendants
have chosen not to sell any raw ore. There therefore
could be no "gross proceeds of sale.'' If effect can be
given to both of two apparently conflicting provisions
of a contract in a reasonable reconciliation, that interpretation should control.

Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 U. 2d 320, 266
P. 2d 494.
A construction of ''ore" as including concentrated ore
eliminates the apparent conflict and should therefore be
adopted, or
(b) if that rule as to conflicting provisions were
not followed, then a resort to parol evidence to solve an
ambiguity "\vould necessitate a trial, thus precluding a
summary judgment.
POINT III.
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DECREE
'THAT PLAINTIFFS RECOVER NOTHING BY THEIR SUIT.

Regardless of the correctness of the court's ruling
granting defendants' 1notion for summary judgn1~nt, the
court's derree disn1issing plaintiffs' con1plaint \Yas erroneous. The basis upon \\Thich this accounting should be
1nade \v·as only· one of the issues involved in the suit.
Defendants' 1notion for sunnnary judgtnent related solely
to the basis of sueh accounting. The determination by the
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lower court as to the basis of the aecoun t ing did not therefore, adjudicate. all of the issues. Xevertheless, the court,
after granting defendants' 1notion for sunrmary judgInent, \\?ent beyond the one issue thus adjudicated, and
ruled that plaintiffs could recover nothing by their
con1plaint. By this judgment plaintiffs have been deprived of any trial to establish :
1. That uranium royalties even based upon the
method of accounting prescribed by the lo\ver court have
not been paid;
2. That plaintiffs are entitled to royalties on vanadium which are admittedly contained "\\7ithin the ores
produced and for which plaintiffs have not been p,aid;
3. That part of the proceeds received by defendants in selling the ore \Vas, in fact, a part of the sales
price rather than a ~'development allowance" as contended by defendants, upon \vhich no royalty has been paid.

V'l e consider these points in order:
The first is self explanatory.
The second involving failure to make royalty payments on vanadium is as follows :
Plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting for, and
payment of, their royalty based on the best sale price of
all ore which defendants by using reasonable efforts
might obtain. 2 Surnrners Oil & Gas par. 400.
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Where, as here, the royalty is based upon the proceeds of sale, there is an implied obligation to market
the production from the property. Townsend v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., ______ Okla. ______ , 332 P. 2d 35.
Defendants cannot rightfully give any of the production a\vay, nor sell for a lo"\\rer price than is reasonably obtainable.
Yet, in the milling agreement with URC, under "Thich
defendants are now operating, there is a provision \\'"hereby the gross proceeds could be \Yrongfully reduced.
Plaintiff's seek an accounting as to \Yhether or not there
has been such a wrongful reduction of gross proceeds,
and if there has, plaintiffs seek a judgment for their
royalty interest therein. The instance is as follows:
By giving away the Vanadiun1 in exchange for a reduction in processing charge (lime penalty) defendants
would have wrongfully reduced the gross price. The
Custom Ivt:illing Agreement ( Tr. 77) provides that defendants shall, until a "ne,w effective plant date,'' have an
election to sell the contained vanadium for 31 cents per
pound and pay an increased treat1nent charge, or give
the vanadium a\Yay and pay no increased charge if ore
contains In ore than 6 7o lin1e. After the '•ne\Y effective
p1ant date" the vanadium is given a\vay in exchange for
no increase in treat1nent charge regardless of the li1ne
content of the ore. Plaintiffs seeks an accounting as to
ho\v 1nuch vanadiu1n ha~ been sold at the 31 cents per
pound price, since this is clearly a part of ''gross proceed~
of sale,~' and plaintiff~ are entitled to a judg1nent for 2%
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of the price thereof if not already paid.

On the other hand, if the vanadium was not sold for
the 31 cents per pound, plaintiffs are entitled to an
accounting as to ho\\T n1uch vanadiu1n has been given
a"Tay, and to a judg1nent f'Or 2% of the value thereof,
since defendants have an implied duty to sell the ore for
the best price obtainable.
The third p·oint involving deduction by defendants
of a false~· developn1ent allo,vance'' is as follo\\Ts:
The governn1ent, in buying ore through the .AEC, as
a n1atter of public policy, paid to the miner 50 cents per
pound of U 3 08 as a develop·ment allowance ''in recognition
of the expenditures necessary for 1naintaining and inereasing developed reserves of uranium ores," ( Tr. 38),
which was designed to be used by him to develop other ore
bodies. This develop1nent allo,vance was expressly exeluded from the gross sales price upon which royalties
should be paid in the agreement providing for plaintiffs'
royalty (Tr. 49).
The public policy of the AEC to develop more sources
of fissionable material is inapplicable where a sale is
made to a private buyer such as lTRC. An)T payment
made by a private buyer is part of the purchase price,
regardless of any subterfuge such as ear1narking part
thereof as an "allo,vance.'' But, instead of showing the
true gross sales price, defendants drafted their sales
agreement with the private buyer UR;C to deduct from
the total sales price a fictitious ~~ develop·ment allo\\Tance"
on 'vhich no royalty \Ya~ paid (Tr. 88).
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Indicative of the fact that there is no separate
"policy'' on the part of a private buyer to develop more
fissionable material is the fact that the sales agreement
with URC provides that when the government stops paying a development allowance (upon the expiration of
Circular 5 on ~1:arch 31, 1962) the fictitious allowance
from lJRC ceases and the full payment of $8.00 per pound
is sho,vn as sales price. ( Tr. 88 reverse side) If there
were any reason for a private buyer to pay a development
allowance, it would not be affected by the government's
elimination of its allowance. The most that can be said
for a development allowance deduction is that if the sale
had been 1nade to the government the government would
have paid an allo,vance. That is no reason to 1nake deduetions fro1n gross sales price ·w·hen a sale is made p-rivately. Plaintiffs seek an accounting and judgment for its
share of the true gross proceeds ""'ithout a deduction of
any artificial 50 cent per pound development allowance.
But not only have defendants created the fiction of a
"develop1nent allowance" in sales to a private buyer, the
development allowance 'vas actually raised even higher
than that paid by the government. The government paid
50 cents (Tr. 38) but defendants and l"'"RC made it 54
cents, and thus arrive at a $7.46 "sales price'' instead of
a true $8.00 pe-r pound (Tr. 88) This adds insult to injury·. If defendants can increase the allow·ance 4 cents,
why couldn't it be increased 6 cents, 10 cents or any larger
portion of the $8.00?
Plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting and judgment
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for not only· the 50 cents but also the extra -1: cents per
pound.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE ROYALTY PROVISION A DIFFER.ENT EFFEICT FOR PAST AND FUT·URE
ROYALTIES.

The Court held that, if plaintiffs did not like the
royalties based on ra\v ore value, .Zn the fut-ure only
plaintiffs might elect to have the royalty based upon the
net proceeds of sale actually received, after deducting
1nilling costs. If, despite the royalty provision language
of ~'gross," not "net'' royalty, plaintiffs have to choose
between these two alternatives, it is better from a tax
depletion standpoint to have the accounting based upon
net proceeds rather than raw ore values, inasmuch as
plaintiffs could get a portion of the benefit of a greater
depletion allo"\\rance. To date, defendants have had the
benefit of all of the increased depletion allowance. Defendants have not just depleted the "working interest"
portion of the proceeds, but have depleted that portion
of the increase in sales price of the ore attributable
to plaintiffs' 2% royalty, since it has depleted 100% of
the gross proceeds of sale, less "raw ore value" royalty
payments (Tr. 43, 92). The court, with no basis for differentiation between past and future royalties, (the
royalty agreement does not change) held that the duty
of the defendants to account on the net actual sales p~rice
basis, which is by far the better of the two poor alternatives given plaintiffs, ap-plies only to future sales.
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sistent, is to hold the royalty provision means one thing
or the other fron1 its inception, rather than changing its
construction only for future production.

CONCLUSION
Technical rules of construction need not be applied
In this case. The plain, clear language of the royalty
provision is "gross proceeds from the sale of all ore.,~
Because the language is unambiguous, parol evidence
must not be considered. The language expressly bases
royalties upon proceeds of sale, and expressly prohibits
deductions. Plaintiffs' motion that the royalties should
be so based should therefore have been granted.
~The

court rejected the language of the royalty provision, and instead gave plaintiffs two alternatives:
Plaintiffs could either, 1-take the value of ra'Y ore, or
2-take the net proceeds of sale. Both alternatives violate the clear provisions set forth in the royalty agreement. The first disregards the "\vords "proceeds of sale";
the second disregards the 'vord "gross" and gives it an
exactly opposite 1neaning of "net." There ,,~as no record
whatsoever in support of such a construction, even if
the court had been justified in looking beyond the language of the agree1nent. Even the parol evidence in the
record supports plaintiffs' n1otion rather than defendants'.

It is not the provinee of the court tb "'Tite a ne"agreeinent for the partie~. Defendant Federal Resouree~
(~orporation i~ hardly an un~ophi~ticated 1niner 'yho

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
1night not have kno"·n the precise 1neaning of 'vords used
in ereating a royalty· interest. \Vhen some confusion existed in the chain of title as to whether there was a" net
1nill or s1nelter return" or a ~'gross proceeds of sale"
royalty, defendants' corporate counsel \vrote an agreeInent expressly stating that the royalty should be based
on gross proceeds. A lawyer would intend the words to
1nean preci~ely what they said; that a gross royalty
~hould be created. If he had intended a net royalty to be
ereated \Yhere by 1nilling or other costs should be deducted
from the gross, he \vould have said so and would have
specified what deductions should be 1nade.
The court based the judg~nent on his own observations of copper mining rather than upon any record.
Its ruling was based entirely on the court's concept that
''concentrates" are not ore. This ignores the dictionary
definitions and defendants' own use of the words indicating otherwise. After so construing the word "ore" the
court then completely ignored all of the other words,
''gross proceeds of sale." A correct construction would
have reconciled all the provisions.
The summary judgment also differentiates between
past and future royalties, creating a situation in \vhich
defendants are entitled to all of the increase in depletion
allo"Tance in the past and permitting plaintiffs to take
its pro-rata share of the increased depletion allowance
only in the future. Such differentiation has no basis, in
that the same royalty provision controls both past and
future royalties.
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Not only did the court err in the construction of the
royalty provision, it went beyond the scope of the n1otion
for summary judgrnent. The 1notion merely sought determination of the basis upon which an accoWlting should
be made, but the court adjudicated that plaintiffs were
not entitled to any accounting whatsoever. The court
thereby deprived plaintiffs of their day in court to ascertain whether or not they had all the uranium royalties
to which they were entitled, (even upon defendants' construction of the royalty provision) and to ascertain
the amount of vanadium royalties to which they "l"ere
entitled, and to ascertain whether or not that which defendants contend is development allowance, not subject
to a royalty, was in fact a part of the purchase price to
which plaintiffs' royalty would apply.
We submit that error "~as committed and that the
judgment should be reversed and an accounting be ordered based upon the language of the royalty provision.
Respectfully subn1itted,
DELANEY & BALCO~IB
and
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY
1001 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants.
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